THIS PAPER DISCUSSES an old and much-maligned topic: the cross-sectional relationship between the concentration of firms in the marketplace and price-cost margins. 1 Because it is hard to imagine a literature for which modern graduate students in economics are taught to have more contempt, some immediate justifications are in order. I have two. First, despite the well-known problems with this literature, it continues to affect antitrust policy. The inappropriate inferences used to justify an active antitrust policy have given way to equally incorrect inferences that have been used to justify a relaxed merger policy. Second, the alternative to cross-industry studies is to study specific industries. Indeed, the econometric analysis of individual industries has been labeled the "new empirical industrial organization. "2 Although this development is a healthy one, it is important to recall that it was the failure of studies of individual industries to yield general insights that made crossindustry studies popular. One might argue that the primary lesson from three decades of cross-sectional studies is that general principles based on simple indicators are not to be had. Nevertheless, the imprecisions 
be made that the dominance had been attained simply by superior performance.
Given the strong policy conclusions drawn from this literature, it is not surprising that objections were raised. If the correlation between measured profits and concentration does not reflect oligopoly profits, then either the difference between measured and true profits is correlated with concentration or the profits correlated with concentration are something other than oligopoly profits. The three other types of profits that they might be are short-term profits arising out of deviations from longterm equilibrium, Ricardian rents, or returns to innovative activity.6 Although each explanation has appeared in the literature, the critique based on Ricardian rents has been the most influential.7 The argument goes as follows. Suppose that all markets are perfectly competitive and that all firms have diminishing returns. In some markets, some firms have large cost advantages, and those firms are both profitable and large. Their size makes the market concentrated, which in turn creates a correlation between market concentration and market profitability. Harold Demsetz argued that this hypothesis implies only normal returns to small firms in concentrated markets, whereas oligopoly theories imply above-normal returns for such firms.8 Demsetz presented evidence that it was only the large firms in concentrated markets that had high returns. When the Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business data became available, the standard test of the revisionist versus the traditional interpretation of the concentration-profits relationship was to in-6. One might argue that the last source of "profits" is really measurement error. There are two levels to this argument. First, measured profits might simply be a normal return to past research and development expenditures. Second, they might represent the difference between expected profits ex ante and realized profits ex post. If one observes all firms that ever tried to enter the industry in question, this difference must be 0 on average. Because unsuccessful firms might exit, however, the difference for the firms in the industry at any given time might be positive. Whether one calls this phenomenon measurement error or the returns to successful innovation is, however, largely a semantic distinction.
7. For the argument that the correlation reflects short-term rents, see Brozen (1970 Brozen ( , 1971a Brozen ( , 1971b . The argument that the relationship reflects Ricardian rents is generally associated with Demsetz (1973) . Although he does not articulate the argument in quite this fashion, Peltzman (1977) makes the case that the relationship reflects a return to innovative activity. For the argument that profits are so badly measured that essentially nothing can be inferred from cross-sectional studies of profitability, see Fisher and McGowan (1985) ; Benston (1985) ; and Fisher (1987) .
8. Demsetz (1973) .
clude both market share and concentration in a profitability regression. The result from doing so was that the coefficient on market share was positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on concentration was negative and significant but small.9 This idea has been extremely influential. For example, in a defense of the FTC's Line of Business program, F. M. Scherer and others consider the finding that market share rather than concentration determines firm profitability the most important result that has emerged from those data. 10 Although they emphasize that their conclusions do not by themselves resolve the traditionalist-revisionist debate, it is hard to imagine why else the findings would be deemed so significant. In his book on the effect of concentration on prices, Leonard Weiss cites Demsetz's critique as a "crucial criticism" of the concentration-profits literature and David Ravenscraft's finding of the relative importance of market share and concentration as the "clincher" in negating the force of these studies to provide evidence of oligopolistic behavior.11 His only refuge was to suggest that perhaps 1974-76, the only years for which the FTC Line of Business data were available, were unusual. To cite just one more example, Richard Schmalensee decomposed Line of Business returns into industry effects, firm effects, and share effects. 12 While he was careful not to present his results as supporting one interpretation or another, a large coefficient on share effects and a small coefficient on industry effects would have been taken as evidence for Demsetz's hypothesis.
It is not clear why Demsetz's critique has been so influential. Perhaps it is because the paper was well written and it was thought that a simple test distinguished the critique from the traditional interpretation. Nevertheless, the various revisionist critiques have different implications for merger policy, which has supplanted deconcentration policy as the key issue in antitrust. If the concentration-profits relationship is caused by short-term or Ricardian rents, then even concentrated markets can be viewed as perfectly competitive, and mergers do not facilitate collusion and higher prices. If profits are returns to innovative activity, however, a short-term oligopolistic equilibrium supports the dynamic competitive 9. Ravenscraft (1983) . 10. Scherer and others (1987) . 11. Weiss (1989, pp. 7, 8) . 12. Schmalensee (1985) . process. 13 Under such an assumption, an increase in concentration can be expected to cause prices to increase at least temporarily.14 I will argue that the most sensible interpretation is that markets are dynamically but not perfectly competitive.
The remainder of this paper reviews methodological issues in more detail, then examines what has happened to the relationship between concentration and price-cost margins over time."5 It is motivated by previous results that the strength of the relationship declined from 1972 to 1981.16 From 1982 to 1984, however, the relationship was strong by historical standards. Next I examine the effects of changes in levels of concentration on prices, costs, and margins. The analysis closely resembles and updates work by Sam Peltzman, whose analysis covered the period 1954-72.17 My analysis covers 1972-82 and reaches two main conclusions. The first, which is consistent with Peltzman's findings, is that increases in concentration are associated with cost and price decreases. This result is the heart of the claim that even if the relationship between concentration and profit margins reflects oligopolistic pricing, the process by which markets become concentrated is part of a dynamically competitive process that is beneficial to the economy. The second is that high levels of concentration were associated with cost and price increases from 1972 to 1982. This finding is consistent with other evidence concerning rent-seeking by workers.18 Finally, I discuss the implications of the results for antitrust policy.
13. The underlying model I am suggesting might be labeled Schumpeterian. For a more modern and formal reference, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) . 14. The welfare implications of allowing mergers that increase prices are ambiguous. If firms are allowed to merge, innovation may be more attractive. (On the other hand, it is not clear that more innovation would improve welfare.) Whether or not such a policy is appropriate, however, any merger that would be known to increase prices would probably be illegal under current enforcement standards.
15. Census of Manufacturers price-cost margins are usually estimated as (revenuespayroll -materials cost)/revenues. The difference between this measure and measures of profits is discussed later.
16. See Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b (1987) . Also see the discussion and references in Schmalensee (1989) .
Methodological Issues
The "plain vanilla" structure-performance regression has some measure of profitability as a dependent variable and some measure of concentration as an independent variable. In general, the rationale for a regression is to test some specific theory or to measure some parameter within a model. For example, one might imagine using such a regression to test the Cournot model of oligopoly. In a Cournot equilibrium,
where L is the market Lerner index, H is the Herfindahl index, and -q is the elasticity of demand. 20. For the long-term (short-term) Lerner index, this approximation is based on the implicit assumption that average cost equals marginal cost (short-term marginal cost equals average variable cost).
21. If all firms were of equal size, the ratio would be 4. For the ratio to be constant across markets, the distribution of firm sizes relative to the largest firm in the market must also be constant across markets. Salinger (1984, p. 165) reports a ratio of about 7. be very surprising if any one of them were rejected. A general conjectural-variations model embodies all possible outcomes. Unless one makes very strong assumptions that essentially eliminate the generality of the model, however, PI cannot be interpreted as a parameter within that model. The parameters in a more complicated model could be given structural interpretations. Because these data are crude, however, complicating the regressions is a questionable strategy.
The rationale for a regression such as equation 3 is that a correlation between concentration and price-cost margins is at least roughly consistent with a broad class of oligopolistic models. As such, it provides some support for thinking of the markets in question as oligopolistic. That evidence would be stronger if the regressions could be given a structural interpretation, and it would be stronger still if a model of perfect competition implied PI = 0.
Demsetz's critique is that perfect competition might imply P1 > 0 as well. Thus even though the findings of the literature are consistent with viewing markets as oligopolistic, they do not constitute a rejection of the natural alternative to oligopoly, perfect competition.
Even though a positive correlation between concentration and profitability could emerge if all markets were perfectly competitive and firms had diminishing returns, this interpretation of the findings is implausible. Its problem lies in the necessity of reconciling high market shares with the assumption of price-taking behavior. Under Demsetz's approach, firms must believe that if they reduce their output, some other firm will increase its output by an equal amount. Because upwardsloping supply curves are an essential part of Demsetz's argument, however, such an assumption is illogical even if it is assumed that other firms behave competitively. The only logical reconciliation is that at some price the market supply curve changes from upward sloping to flat. Such an assumption is difficult to refute, but it is hardly standard.22
As was mentioned in the introduction, the finding that a regression of firm profitability on concentration and market share yields a positive 22. The more typical approach to reconciling large market shares with competitive behavior is to assume contestability. Contestability results are not, however, robust to minor changes in the assumption that sunk costs are literally zero. See Stiglitz (1988) . Moreover, the evidence from the airline market, which was the prototypical economist's example of a contestable market, tends to refute the contestability hypothesis. See Morrison and Winston (1987) . coefficient on concentration and a negative coefficient on market share has been taken as evidence in favor of Demsetz's hypothesis and against the traditional interpretation. This conclusion simply is not warranted. In a Cournot equilibrium, the Lerner index for an individual firm, L, is given by
where Si is the market share of firm i. That is, in a Cournot equilibrium, profitability is a function of market share, not market concentration. In fact, virtually any oligopoly model in which firm size is endogenous must have the feature that small firms earn low margins. A small firm earning a high margin would typically be able to increase its output without having a substantial effect on the market price.23 Of course, the Cournot model does not explain the negative coefficient on concentration that David Ravenscraft found. The magnitude of that coefficient is, however, small. Moreover, the negative coefficient is not predicted by the differential-efficiency view either.
The Dependent Variable
In the early work in this literature the dependent variable was the accounting return on assets. Starting with N. R. Collins and L. E. Preston, however, the use of Census of Manufacturers price-cost margins became popular.24 Price-cost margins are a proxy for the return on sales. Depending on the precise way in which they are measured, they might be interpreted as short-term or long-term returns on sales. Several recent papers have used Tobin's q, the ratio of market value to replacement value, as the measure of profitability.25
In choosing among the alternatives, one must first decide whether the objective is to measure the determinants of profitability or the nature 23. If all firms had equal costs and market share was simply a matter of historical accident, then small firms would have the same profitability as large firms. Alternatively, small firms may be those that have found small, profitable niches that are arguably understood as separate markets. A related possibility is that small firms might commit to being small to make it irrational for large firms to prey upon them. See Gelman and Salop (1983 of short-term equilibria. The former interpretation of this literature is standard, but the latter may be the more relevant consideration for some policy issues. To ascertain the determinants of profitability, some normalization is necessary. If the cost measure excludes a normal return to investment, then assets are the appropriate normalization.26 If a normal return to investment is included in costs, then either sales or assets can be used, but relationships such as equations 1 and 4 might dictate the use of sales. The use of Tobin's q is also appropriate for such studies: the general rationale is that it is measured more precisely than the return on assets.
Several recent papers, most notably one by Franklin Fisher and John McGowan, have argued that the problems with measuring economic depreciation are so severe that accounting measures of the return on assets cannot be assumed to bear any resemblance to the true return.27 Even though Tobin's q is likely to be measured more precisely than the return on assets, the measurement of the denominator suffers from the same problem raised by Fisher and McGowan. In another paper Fisher has argued that accounting measures of the return on sales are similarly flawed, but the argument there is weaker.28 Errors in measuring depreciation taint both the numerator and the denominator of the return on assets; they taint only the numerator in the return on sales. Moreover, because capital costs are typically a relatively small fraction of the total costs of production, the magnitudes of the errors are probably small.
The arguments about the errors in measuring profitability are based entirely on hypothetical examples. Whether the measures are so flawed that they render invalid any conclusions that might be drawn from crosssectional studies of profitability, or whether they simply weaken results that would have been stronger had the measurement problems been less severe, is not known. The key to an appropriate test was put succinctly by Fisher and McGowan: "It is an economic rate of return (after risk adjustment) above the cost of capital that promotes expansion under competition and is produced by output restriction under monopoly. 29 26. The rationale is that it is the return to assets, not the return to sales, that is equalized across industries (on the margin and after adjustment for risk).
27. Fisher and McGowan (1985 32. One might object that such a test would be appropriate if all markets were competitive but that the presence of rents (either monopoly or Ricardian) implies that economic profits will not always be associated with expansion. This argument suggests ajoint approach to testing for the validity of a profit measure and assessing the effects of concentration. Rather than correlating profitability with measures of market structure, let some measure of the flow of resources be the dependent variable in a regression and the hypothesized measure of profitability and concentration be explanatory variables. The combination of a positive coefficient on the profitability measure and a negative coefficient on concentration would suggest that in concentrated industries, high profits do not signal an expansion of output, which in turn would ultimately result in a price reduction. I tried this approach without much success for price-cost margins in exploratory work for this paper and for q in Salinger (1983 The demand elasticity that enters equation 1 is the elasticity of residual demand facing the firms included in the market, not the elasticity of demand for the product itself. That elasticity is likely to depend at least as much on entry barriers as on the pure demand elasticity.
As with the choice of dependent variable, the treatment of entry barriers turns at least in part on whether one is testing for the determinants of profitability or for the nature of short-term equilibrium. The appropriate definition of entry barriers differs in these two cases. For the former an entry barrier is a condition that allows firms in the market to charge a price above average cost without inviting entry. This definition was the one suggested by Joe Bain.36 For the latter it is a condition that allows firms to price above short-term marginal cost without inviting entry.
The measurement of entry barriers has, however, proved elusive. Consider, first, the barriers relevant for ascertaining the determinants of profitability. Bain used subjective measures. Not only does such an approach necessarily generate irreconcilable questions of judgment, but it runs the risk of being tautologous. An entry barrier is defined as a condition that allows firms to earn abnormally high profits without attracting entry. Any researcher who is familiar enough with an industry to classify the level of entry barriers sensibly will also know its measured profitability. Such knowledge is bound to affect the entry barrier classification.
Objective 
components. The measurement of sunk costs remains difficult, although the work of loannis Kessides represents a major advance.38
Any entry barrier that is relevant for the determinants of profitability is also an entry barrier for testing the nature of short-term equilibrium. In addition, scale economies alone (even without sunk costs) are an entry barrier for this purpose. As mentioned earlier, however, the crosssectional measures of scale economies are at best crude.
Although a better treatment of entry would vastly improve this literature, it is not clear how the failure to treat it effectively or to treat it at all could create a spurious correlation between concentration and profitability. It seems plausible that concentration is correlated with entry barriers, so one might suspect omitted variable bias. Still, it would be surprising if exogenous increases in concentration did not result in price increases in those markets in which significant entry barriers exist.
Simultaneity Issues
That advertising intensity is endogenous in a profitability regression raises a general point that virtually all variables put into profitability regressions are endogenous. With only a handful of possible exceptions, the variables used are choice variables for the firm.39 These variables are chosen to maximize a firm's profits. This problem is most acute when the firm or line of business is the unit of observation. Since a firm's profitability is a component of industry profitability, the problem also exists when the industry is the unit of observation.
A potentially major concern about the proper interpretation of structure-performance regressions is that concentration itself is endogenous.i0 Concentration depends on the output decisions of individual firms, which in turn affect prices. If a large firm chooses a higher output than is predicted by the underlying (implicit) model, concentration will be higher and profits will be lower than expected. Thus output errors 38. Kessides (1986) . 39. Measures of the type of customer are arguably exogenous. 40. Because Demsetz's critique highlights the importance of the process that determines concentration, one might suspect that it implies that concentration is endogenous. In fact, however, Demsetz's argument is that more than one model is consistent with the standard structure-performance regression, not that the regression is misspecified, given either of the underlying models.
by large firms reduce the correlation between concentration and profitability. By the same line of reasoning, output errors by small firms increase the correlation between concentration and profitability. It is plausible that large firms have greater discretion over their output and that the magnitude of these errors for them is consequently greater. If so, the endogeneity of concentration causes a reduction in the measured correlation between concentration and profitability.
The endogeneity of concentration notwithstanding, it is likely that technology generates a substantial amount of exogenous cross-sectional variation in concentration.41 Although there may be some technologically linked change in concentration within industries, much more of the intertemporal variation is likely to be caused by changes in conduct. Consider an industry with a group of dominant firms and a competitive fringe. Suppose the dominant firms sometimes collude to keep prices high and that the fringe expands during such periods. Periodically, however, the dominant firms engage in price wars, in which case the fringe shrinks. Prices and (probably) profits will be lower and concentration will be higher during the price wars. Thus the correlation between concentration and profitability can be negative. Such a finding would not suggest, however, that a merger between two of the dominant firms would result in lower prices and profits.
One variable that is likely to create serious endogeneity bias is import intensity. Although an exogenous increase in imports typically reduces profits of domestic firms, high profits create an incentive for greater import penetration. Thus a positive coefficient on import penetration in a profitability regression should not be particularly surprising. This study is based on a panel that contains annual data on shipments, costs, inventories, value added, and capital. For some of the variables, including shipments, the data set contains both nominal and real values. Thus it is possible to estimate the rate of price increase by comparing the ratio of the nominal value of shipments to the real value of shipments in different years. It also contains data on hours worked by production workers and total production wages, from which a production wage rate can be calculated. See the appendix for a more complete description.
The One other point to note about this group of results is the coefficient on the capital intensity variable. As in the results of Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, it is positive throughout the 1970s and significant in most years. That result changes dramatically in the 1980s, when the coefficient becomes significantly negative. This result is rather puzzling. It would not be particularly surprising if the return on assets were negatively correlated with capital intensity in downturns. Because most of the costs captured in the price-cost margin are variable, it is not clear why a similar result with price-cost margins should arise. Moreover, the coefficients are negative in some expansion years.46
One conceivable explanation of a decline in the measured relationship between concentration and margins is that the errors induced by in-45. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a). 46. The estimated coefficients on concentration and on capital intensity also seem to be negatively correlated with each other. One might suspect, therefore, that collinearity between the two makes the estimates of the individual coefficients unstable and is the source of much of the intertemporal variation in the coefficients. As it turns out, however, concentration and the capital-sales ratio are not that highly correlated. A regression of concentration on capital intensity yields R2's of roughly .05. The coefficient on concentration remains virtually unchanged when capital intensity is excluded from the regressions altogether. When the coefficient on capital intensity is restricted to . 1, which is roughly the largest of the estimated coefficients on capital intensity reported in table I and which is arguably a plausible adjustment for the cost of capital, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients drops somewhat. However, the pattern remains the same. Peltzman (1988) , "cost of sales and operations" was assumed to correspond to labor expense plus materials cost, and "other deductions" were assumed to correspond to general and administrative expenses. General and administrative expenses for the Census data were then estimated by taking the ratio of "other deductions" to "cost of sales and operations" and multiplying the result by the sum of materials cost and labor expense. This adjustment had no quantitative impact on the regression of margins on concentration.
Concentration, Changes in Concentration, and Changes in Prices and Costs
Even if one accepts the proposition that the concentration-margins relationship reflects at least short-term oligopolistic behavior, the policy implications turn on how concentration is determined. The Neal report's recommendation to break up dominant firms would seem to be based on the implicit assumption that concentration can be viewed as exogenous.49 A natural alternative hypothesis is that concentration is the by-product of a dynamically competitive process in which firms compete to produce better products and lower production costs. Those firms that succeed in the competition gain short-term monopoly power. An informal test of this hypothesis is to see whether increases in concentration are associated with increases or decreases in prices. This is the general approach suggested by Sam Peltzman.50
Peltzman examined this issue indirectly by combining results on the effects of changes in concentration on changes in margins and changes in unit costs. His model embodied features that seem rather ad hoc, most notably the assumption that the relative change in efficiency between large and small firms depends on market growth. That assumption complicated the estimation procedure; as a result concentration entered the equation for changes in cost in complicated ways. Particularly, given the well-known imprecisions with these data, trying to detect complicated nonlinearities is a questionable strategy. Thus the estimation in this paper is a stripped-down version of Peltzman's model. Table 3 is designed to capture changes in materials prices. Because the materials used vary across industries, it is important to capture differences in increases in materials prices, particularly in light of the change in oil prices between 1972 and 1982. Although the data set used in this study does not contain a materials-price index, it does contain real and nominal values for materials inventories. Under the arguably strong assumption that materials are inventoried in proportion to their use, a materials-price index can be calculated. This index is then multiplied by the ratio of materials costs to revenues at the beginning of the period.
Row 1 contains a regression of the change in price on just the change in concentration and the two cost variables. The coefficient on concentration is negative but insignificant. That result does not, however, fully address the issue of whether increases in concentration are associated with price increases or price decreases. Decreases in prices associated with decreases in concentration will tend to make the coefficient positive. However, Peltzman's hypothesis is that both large decreases and large increases in concentration are associated with cost-reducing structural changes. Thus the one nonlinearity from Peltzman's analysis that must be preserved is the separate treatment of increases and decreases in concentration. This is accomplished by including the absolute value of the change in concentration as well as the change in concentration as regressors.
The results are consistent with Peltzman's, even though they are for a different and shorter time period. The coefficient on the absolute value of the change in concentration is negative and significant and the coefficient on the change in concentration is negative but insignificant. They lend support to the idea that even though concentration is associated with the higher margins that may arise from collusion, the process by which markets become concentrated entails cost reductions that dominate any effects of collusion.
The changes in prices associated with changes in margins must be associated with changes in costs or margins or both. Table 4 presents the results of regressions of the change in margins on the change in concentration. Row 1 contains a regression of the changes in margins on changes only in domestic adjusted concentration. The coefficient on concentration is positive, significant, and roughly the same size as the cross-sectional estimates. The similarity of the coefficients when the concentration-margins equation is specified in levels and when it is Row 2 includes the absolute value of changes in concentration as an independent variable. These results can be interpreted in two ways. The coefficient on |C41 is not statistically significant. If one concludes that the coefficient should be considered 0, then the results suggest that decreases in concentration reduce margins by the same amount as increases in concentration increase them. Alternatively, the coefficient on |C41 is nearly significant and of comparable magnitude to the coefficient on C4. In fact, the difference between the two is not statistically significant. That part of the result could be taken to indicate that decreases in concentration do not result in decreases in margins.52 The 52. Peltzman (1977) argued that if all markets were perfectly competitive, then decreases in concentration should be associated with increases in margins just as much as increases in concentration are. His point was that any major structural change, be it concentration increasing or concentration decreasing, should be associated with higher margins. His result that decreases in concentration are not associated with increases in margins is his basis for adopting what he termed an eclectic view instead of accepting the hypothesis of perfect competition. The argument is not altogether persuasive, however. Suppose that markets are perfectly competitive and firms have diminishing returns. Furthermore, suppose the typical industry pattern is that some firms gain a large advantage, after which the other firms catch up. In the first stage, there is an increase in concentration and a reduction in prices. Provided that the increased margins for the innovators dominate the reduced margins for the laggards, industry margins will also increase. In the second stage, both concentration and prices decrease; and industry margins will decrease as well (assuming that they increased in stage 1). This process is consistent with the findings here and in Peltzman. Thus, the rejection of the Demsetz hypothesis still rests on the logical problem of reconciling large market shares, diminishing returns, and price-taking behavior rather than a statistical result. third row includes the change in import intensity as an explanatory variable (and as a result is based only on the sample for which such data are available). The coefficient on import intensity is positive and significant, perhaps because import intensity cannot be taken as exogenous. Brozen (1970 Brozen ( , 1971a Brozen ( , 1971b what is properly meant by the short term, the data fail to support Brozen's hypothesis. And although the data are consistent with the hypothesis that market power is the reward for successful innovation, the market power that does result tends to be long-lived.
It is of interest to examine how much of the cross-sectional relationship in, say
Even if increases in concentration are associated with price reductions, the level of concentration could be a concern if it were associated with increases in prices. One might argue that the theoretical effect of concentration is on the level of prices, not the rate of increase. However, there are plausible industry dynamics in which concentration would be associated with price increases. The results so far have suggested that markets become concentrated when one or a few firms develop competitive advantages that result in at least temporary monopoly power. The results of table 5 suggest that although this market power is not permanent, it tends to persist for long periods. A possible result of this monopoly power is that suppliers would gradually bid away some of the monopoly rents by raising input prices, which would induce the firm to raise the price of the final product. Table 6 shows regressions similar to those in table 3, except that the concentration level at the beginning of the period is included as an explanatory variable. The coefficient on lagged concentration is positive and statistically significant. From table 1 it can be seen that the standard deviation of concentration levels is four times as great as the standard deviation of changes in concentration. Thus, the effect on price of the level of concentration is of roughly the same magnitude as the effect of changes in concentration.
In the sample for this paper, the level of concentration is not associated with increases in margins. Thus the correlation between concentration and price increases must be the result of cost increases. In light of the literature on rent sharing, a cost increase that one might expect to be associated with concentration is wage increases. Table 7 represents regressions of wage increases on levels and changes in concentration and the absolute value of the change in concentration. Lagged wages are included to capture any regression toward the mean, and changes in the ratio of imports to sales are also included for the sample in which those data are available. In all the regressions, the coefficient 
Conclusions and Implications for Antitrust Policy
The traditionalist-revisionist debate generally concerns whether the relationship of concentration and profits or concentration and margins best reflects competition or market power. The most plausible interpretation of the data is that the relationship reflects both. Dynamic competition gives rise to short-term market power. Such a conclusion is not particularly profound. Edward Chamberlin and Joseph A. Schumpeter articulated the point earlier and better than I have and many will undoubtedly consider it self-evident.55 Nevertheless, the literature has focused on whether markets are perfectly or imperfectly competitive, and the current conventional wisdom is that the data are more consistent with perfect competition.
The traditionalist-revisionist debate developed amid the controversy over deconcentration policies. Merger policy has, however, supplanted deconcentration policy as the focus in antitrust matters. The implications of these conclusions for merger policy turn on how mergers fit into the process that the data suggest. For example, one might suspect that mergers are an integral part of the process by which markets become more concentrated and prices are reduced. The evidence from Peltzman and this paper concerns the years 1947 to 1982. It is extremely unlikely that any substantial increase in concentration was accomplished by merger in this period: the antitrust authorities and the courts would not have permitted it. Thus these results cannot be taken as evidence that horizontal mergers create efficiencies.
Still, a prominent theory of takeovers is that well-run companies acquire poorly run companies and improve their performance. Some point to large takeover premiums as evidence for this hypothesis. 56 Whether the combined value of acquirers and targets increases at the time of merger announcements (as opposed to just the value of the target's shares) is not, however, clear.57 Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the acquiring firms experience large and statistically significant negative abnormal returns in the two years after mergers.58 55. Although based on a completely different set of results, this conclusion is similar to the one in Hall (1988 Ravenscraft and Scherer fail to find any evidence of increases in profitability from mergers.59 Thus neither the stock market nor the accounting evidence provides support for efficiencies resulting from mergers.
In the most convincing evidence to date of such efficiencies Frank Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel show that plants changing ownership have, on average, lower productivity than plants in the same industry that do not change.60 But seven years after the ownership change, the productivity of those plants is nearly the same as productivity in plants that did not change owners. Although the authors obtain significant tstatistics in regressions of productivity changes on ownership change dummies, the effect is economically small.61 At most, the finding suggests that a policy to discourage ownership changes in general would be ill-advised. To justify a tolerance of horizontal mergers, competitors would have to be better able to bring about productivity increases than noncompetitors. One might suspect that to be the case, but I know of no systematic evidence to support it.
Although increases in concentration resulting from mergers cannot be assumed to have the same cost-reducing benefits as endogenous increases in concentration, they could have the same effect on margins. The empirical results presented here suggest that markets should be viewed as oligopolistic. In virtually any oligopoly model, a merger of two firms makes the market less competitive.
In addition to this concern, the results suggest that increases in concentration may eventually result in increased costs and prices. This possibility is more speculative. The relationship between the level of concentration and cost and price changes may simply be a reflection of the economy in the 1970s rather than a standard pattern for industry dynamics.62 Nonetheless, the possibility that it is a standard pattern should not be dismissed out of hand.
Optimal merger policy must take into account imperfection in the judgment of the antitrust authorities and the courts. Thus if there were 59. Ravenscraft (1987) . 60. Lichtenberg (1987) . 61. The results are based on some 18,000 observations. With such a large sample the coefficients can be estimated precisely enough to reject the hypothesis that even very small effects are significantly different from 0.
62. I am indebted to Sam Peltzman for pointing out to me that the level of concentration was associated with price decreases in earlier periods. It is, of course, possible that unions became better at bargaining away rents in the 1970s than they were previously. strong evidence of efficiencies resulting from mergers and little evidence of collusive effects from concentration, then there should be a presumption that horizontal mergers should not be blocked. But there is little if any general evidence supporting efficiencies from mergers, and there is some possibility that concentration results in higher prices. Thus a stricter policy toward horizontal mergers than the one that prevailed during the Reagan administration would be appropriate. This is not to suggest that efficiencies never arise or that an efficiency defense should not be allowed. However, there should be a strong presumption that mergers violating the concentration standards in the merger guidelines are illegal, and merging parties should bear a strong burden of proof that efficiencies justify overturning that presumption. The industrial classification scheme used to record imports and exports is somewhat different from SIC codes. IMP/S was recorded for an SIC code whenever it was completely covered by an import code. In many cases, the value for IMP/S is for a broader classification than the 4-digit SIC code. In some cases, an import number is reported but a value for IMP/S is not, and a footnote indicates that imports and domestic production are not comparable. In those cases, IMP/S was recorded as missing. Because of the differences in the industrial classification scheme, import-adjusted concentration ratios cannot be calculated for all industries. Accordingly, the estimation in which importadjusted concentration ratios are used is based on a smaller sample.
Appendix: Description of Variables and Data Sources

Comments and Discussion
Comment by Richard E. Caves: Salinger's paper revisits most of the issues in industrial organization that have been debated in the past two decades. I shall concentrate on a few main issues.
One major topic addressed by the paper is the relationship between changes in concentration and changes in prices, with Salinger replicating Sam Peltzman's result that productivity (output price with changes in input price controlled) declines in industries experiencing increasing producer concentration. The important question is which of many possible mechanisms underlies any relation between changes in concentration and the revenue productivity of an industry's resource usage?
The trouble, which also plagues analyses of the bivariate relationship of profits and concentration, is that empirically concentration is a decidedly endogenous variable in two senses. In the long run it is determined by the various possible forms of economies of scale, first-mover advantage, and input-market imperfection identified by the theory of entry barriers. The normative significance of these entry barriers is controversial and varies from one to another. Nonetheless, entry barriers account for much of the variance of concentration among industries. Although changes in concentration cannot be explained well (concentration usually does not change much, as Salinger notes), it would be surprising if changes in structural determinants did not count. In the short run, concentration depends on the price and output decisions of the firms in the market, because these decisions affect their market shares. Shares could change to reflect changes in firms' variable costs but also breakdowns in collusive behavior and various other sorts of 322 strategic interaction. Until the mechanism responsible for a change in concentration, either typically or in a specific case, is known, normative conclusions about any relation between productivity and changes in concentration are difficult to draw.
A substantial new finding by Salinger is that the effect of concentration on price-cost margins is largely independent of any link between productivity growth and changes in concentration. Salinger -A deconcentration policy is pointless if existing concentration represents an equilibrium governed by more fundamental determinants. We should simply expect equilibrium to be restored.
-The only effective deconcentration policy is one that focuses primarily (perhaps entirely) on the underlying determinants rather than on concentration itself. The antitrust literature contains several examples of arguably successful policies that took this route.3
Comment by Sam Peltzman: The relationship of concentration and profit is a staple of the literature, and whenever one thinks the last word on it has been heard, a paper such as Salinger's tells us differently. It is one of the very few attempts I know of that tries to bring together the two main interpretations of this literature: the collusive story and the efficiency story.
I want to concentrate on just a few main results and on Salinger's interpretation of them. The first part of the paper, summarized by table 2, extends the literature on the relationship of concentration and margins into the 1980s. His main conclusion is that the previously heralded decline in the strength of this relationship is not true if concentration is correctly measured. The main reason for this is the growth of world trade, which has introduced increasing measurement error into domestic concentration as the right proxy for the relevant market structure. If this growth is taken into account, the deterioration goes away.
I suspect this conclusion is right, on balance, but Salinger's procedure is not entirely convincing because the adjustment for imports introduces its own error. His "adjusted concentration ratio" is some standard concentration ratio times one minus the ratio of imports to sales. This obviously goes in the right direction in the sense that if there are high imports, there are generally more sellers and less concentration. But this cannot be right for every case. For example, in consumer electronics the ratio of imports to sales must be close to one. This would make the adjusted concentration ratio close to zero, but the correct ratio is almost surely larger.
The problem, of course, is that the ranks of the large firms selling in the market now contain some foreign firms. There is no obvious way that I know of around this problem, but it calls for some caution in concluding that nothing has changed in the relationship between concentration and profitability.
In table 2 all of the effect of imports is forced to work through the concentration ratio. Suppose the truth is that imports constrain margins independent of concentration. Then the coefficient of adjusted concentration is a compound of two effects. One is a concentration effect and the other an effect operating through imports more generally. It is therefore unclear whether only the concentration effect is producing the pattern, or more precisely the lack of any pattern, in the time series of those coefficients.
It would have been, I think, better on the whole to have run the regressions with those two variables separated. Then one could ask, if the import-sales ratio is held fixed, is there still about the same relationship between margins and concentration?
Apart from this interpretive problem, there is a puzzle in table 2. The coefficient of the capital-sales ratio has declined during the 1970s and 1980s, and in fact has become a negative. It is a puzzle because capital does not seem to be paying for the privilege of serving us. What the ratio actually implies is that highly capital-intensive industries have been doing badly.
There is a related mystery in the results. The year-to-year changes in the coefficients of concentration in the capital-sales ratio, the secondto-last column of table 2, show a substantial negative correlation between the changes in these coefficients (the simple correlation is -.7). Thus high concentration apparently leads to especially high margins in those years when capital-intensive industries are doing especially badly. But this conclusion is the opposite of the true trend, which is that both concentration and capital-sales ratios are having a weaker effect over time. In the short run, the worse the capital-intensive industries are doing, the more powerful the relation between concentrations and mar- He gives two reasons for this, and I cannot understand either one. There is a theoretical reason, the conclusion of which is that the dif- Figure 1 illustrates this point. We like to think that constant costs are a fairly good approximation to a lot of manufacturing industry supply conditions. I take a garden-variety, constant-cost competitive industry as my starting point. Every firm has the pair of cost curves MC and AC, and LRS is the longrun supply function. Now let one firm discover a technique such that marginal and average cost is lower at every output (MC1 and AC1). This is the simplest representation of differential efficiency. This leads first of all to the efficient firm's increasing its size relative to the average. That is its output increases from q* to q**. That shows up as an increase in concentration. This firm also earns efficiency rents (the shaded area), which show up as an increase in industry margins. And, crucially, the long-run supply function has exactly the kind of kink in it that Salinger is describing (his DEF over the relevant range).
It is premature to say that this is an exotic case. One cannot rule out a priori the case that may be dominating the levels of regression. Salinger also has an empirical argument, which is that margins in 1982 are just as well explained by concentration in 1972 as in 1982. That is in table 5. One is supposed to draw the inference that cost and price changes caused by the 1972-82 changes in concentration have to be pretty small potatoes. I think more needs to be said. Look at the facts as they are laid out in this paper. Table 4 shows that an increase in concentration during these ten years led to an increase in margins with the coefficient roughly comparable to those found in the levels regressions of table 2. Table 3 shows that increases in concentration result in lower prices. The only way table 4 and table 3 can be reconciled, obviously, is that costs had to go down more than prices went down to generate an increase in margins in those industries that have become more concentrated.
If cost-reducing increases in concentration are driving the relationship between changes in margins and changes in concentration and if that relationship is roughly the same as in the levels, I fail to understand why the levels regressions cannot be reflecting the cumulation of similar such effects over many decades.
There may be reasons to doubt that. For example, there ought to be adaptations by other firms to some of these cost innovations. But that is a separate issue not at all addressed in this paper. I think the only reasonable interpretation of the whole body of results here is the eclectic one that, on balance, I share with Salinger. The overall profit-margins relationship, whether it is in the levels of regression or the changes-I cannot make the distinctions he makes-is driven by a mix of efficiency rents and imperfect competition.
This leads me to policy conclusions that are also eclectic, more so than Salinger's. He wants policy to tilt toward restricting mergers, even though increasing concentration is generally associated with efficiency increases. He gives two reasons. One is that, after all, most increases in concentration occur without mergers. That is, of course, right. The inference we are supposed to draw is that efficient firms can increase market share without mergers. His second reason is that direct evidence for the efficiency effects of mergers is spotty. The inference here is that other ways of increasing concentration are, perhaps, more important than mergers in producing the associated efficiency gains.
I have trouble with both arguments. First, I think he reads the evidence wrongly. Most of the mergers in the studies he cites are not horizontal mergers. As he points out, until the 1980s these were very restricted. Second, and more important, if increasing concentration is generally promoting efficiency, mergers are surely going to be the lowcost method of increasing concentration in some cases. For example, consider a declining industry that has to have some reduction in the number of firms and some increase in concentration. It may be cheaper to shift legal titles around than to force some more indirect transfer of resources.
This does not mean that all mergers should be allowed or that the current margin of policy is right. It does mean that, instead of presuming that efficiencies do not exist unless otherwise shown, which is how Salinger would like policy to proceed, the presumption ought to be the opposite. That is, policy ought to be tolerant of mergers unless there are fairly compelling reasons to fear an anticompetitive outcome.
Finally, there are some interesting puzzles resulting from his data that need some exploration. The first is in table 3, which shows that labor-intensive industries have had increasing relative prices in the 1970s and 1980s. Salinger put a labor-intensity variable in this change regression on the possibility that there could have been a change in the relative price of labor. But the positive labor coefficient makes sense only if the relative price of labor has increased. Table 1 -his summary data-shows that this is not so. In fact, given the growth in productivity, unit labor costs have fallen in these two decades. The obverse of this result is that prices have gone down in capital-intensive industries. This is another indication of how the terms of trade have turned against capital-intensive industries.
The second fact is that industries with high levels of concentration in 1972 had increasing relative prices between 1972 and 1982. Salinger alluded to this result as part of the justification for a tough stance on mergers. This result is the opposite of the relationship that had been observed in the 20 years up to 1972. Up to that time most of the evidence showed that high initial concentration is associated with decreasing prices.
This has implications for the productivity puzzle of the 1970s and 1980s. First, it is clear that what Salinger finds is not a long-term relationship; relative prices in highly concentrated industries have not been increasing without bounds. What his result does say is that those manufacturing industries that were leading productivity growth before 1970-the highly concentrated industries-are lagging now.
General Discussion: A number of participants questioned the quality of the data used in the paper. Franklin Fisher noted that the substantial measurement errors associated with determining the value of capital call into question the accuracy of some of the variables used. Robert Hall said that the headquarters costs, notably advertising, omitted by the establishment-based Census of Manufacturers significantly distort the data that come from that census. Studies of census margins are effectively studies of advertising in some industries.
Steven Salop said that because Reagan administration antitrust policy permitted horizontal mergers, a rich new data set is emerging that should allow investigation into whether increased concentration leads to higher margins, higher prices, and lower costs. Frank Lichtenberg said that he and Moshe Kim had recently conducted a study on such data when they looked at the airline industry from 1970 to 1984. The conclusions were that in the airline industry, mergers that increase concentration lead to cost and price reductions and to only very slight increases in profit margins. He attributed part of the cost reductions to increased capacity utilization-that is, increased load factors.
Dennis Mueller said that monopoly profits are not such a problem in oligopostic industries or in industries where there is collusion. In many markets-for example, breakfast cereals-product differentiation created quasi monopolies, and it is in these industries that high profits are found.
Lawrence White said the positive correlation between 1972 concentration in an industry and the change in prices from 1972 to 1982 might be caused by the wage-price controls of the early 1970s. The wageprice controls might have affected concentrated industries more than nonconcentrated ones "because it is easier to control General Motors' prices than Joe's Garage's," so the change in prices might include a return to the long-run equilibrium of prices and wages disrupted by the price controls.
Richard Nelson offered an alternative dynamic theory for the relationship between prices and concentration. He said that when a new technology comes into being, it can take many forms and can result in many different products. There will be many firms, mostly small, and they will try to develop the technology in a number of different directions. Research will be undirected, and most firms will not have an advantage over other firms at first. As information about the technology begins to accumulate, certain forms of the technology will begin to look good relative to other forms. The research will become more directed and systematic, and this will show up as increases in productivity and decreases in cost and price. In addition, some firms will be successful and others will fail. Economies of scale in production will result. Nelson said this means that the period of rapid growth of technology will include productivity growth, cost reduction, price reduction, and increasing industry concentration. As the technology stabilizes, productivity growth slows and concentration growth tends to stop.
Dennis Carlton was interested in the policy implications that resulted from the paper. Current merger guidelines say that there should be concern if a merger will likely lead to a 5 to 10 percent increase in prices. Given some of the coefficients estimated in the paper, even an increase in the concentration ratio from 40 percent to 90 percent would lead to only a 5 percent increase in price, according to Carlton.
